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Abstract – The conventional model for corporate governance depends on the rarely 
articulated assumption that the costs of failure are largely internalised by the firm and 
so are taken into account when shareholders determine their risk appetite. In this paper 
I argue that, when applied to banks, this view is mistaken. Banks do not internalise the 
costs of failure, hence the risk appetite of bank shareholders is socially excessive. I 
show that shareholder pressure on their management to accept greater risk can help 
explain the excessive risk-taking of banks. My analysis indicates that recent 
corporate governance reforms that attempt to tighten the alignment of managerial 
and shareholder interests cannot be expected to address the problem I identify. To 
adequately understand what policies should be explored, we must first recognise 
that excessive risk-taking is also partly a product of the conventional model. I 
therefore propose a modification to the conventional model: a regime of double 
liability that is triggered by bank failure. I analyse how this will reduce bank 
shareholders’ risk appetite and make excessive risk-taking less likely. Welfare 
improvement occurs because of heightened risk awareness and enhanced risk-taking 
controls, decreasing the likelihood of failure. Finally, examining a range of possible 
objections, I conclude that they do not provide a good basis for opposing a regime of 
double liability and the burden is now on proponents to justify the current limited 
liability regime for bank shareholders. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Many believe that companies can enhance social welfare when managers 
seek to maximise shareholder wealth.1 Under this approach, which I label 
“the shareholder-orientated model,” the managers’ incentives are aligned 
with those of the shareholders. The theory behind shareholder primacy 
drove the model towards attaining the status of orthodoxy. It has since 
exerted a profound influence on how we think about corporate 
                                                
* LL.B. (Hons.); Bachelor of Civil Law, University of Oxford. Thanks are due to 
Professor Paul Davies for extremely helpful comments and guidance on earlier drafts. 
I am also grateful for conversations with Professor John Armour and Dr James Cullen. 
Any mistakes are, of course, my own. 
1 See, Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, 
N.Y. Times Mag., September 13, 1970. See also, Henry Hansmann and Reinier 
Kraakman, ‘Toward a Single Model of Corporate Law?’ in Joseph A McCahery et al 
(eds), Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity (OUP, 2002) 58. 
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governance. One result has been the increase in the prevalence of 
shareholder rights.2  
Some commentators argue that managerial incentives played a 
significant role in the risk-taking decisions financial firms made in the 
years preceding the financial crisis of 2008-2009.3 As emphasised by Ben 
Bernanke, now Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the risk-taking 
behaviour of banks affects financial and economic fragility.4 Therefore, the 
strength of the legal environment to mitigate excessive risk-taking of 
banks is a key to the success of the financial system. Most literature 
addressing excessive bank risk-taking through corporate governance 
focuses on managerial incentives.5 Discussion of the risk appetite of bank 
shareholders has been relatively neglected. As a first step to make up for 
this neglect, such analysis is offered in this paper. 
In the search of explanations for excessive bank risk-taking, one 
prominent argument is that the invectives of managers have not been 
optimally aligned with the interests of shareholders. It is fair to regard this 
as the conventional account. This account, which has become widely 
accepted, has prompted legislators and regulators to implement changes 
                                                
2 As Murphy and Zabojnik note, “The shareholder-rights movement beginning in the 
late 1980s and the increased ownership of large institutional investors has forced 
CEOs to lead their companies’ investor-relation efforts, communicating directly with 
shareholders and institutions.” Kevin Murphy and Jan Zabojnik, ‘Managerial Capital and 
the Market for CEOs’ (2007) Working Paper, 5. 
3 See, Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Holger Spamann, ‘The Wages of Failure: 
Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008’ (2010) 27 Yale 
Journal of Regulation 257. See also, Paul Krugman, Reform or Bust, New York Times, 
September 21, 2009 (arguing, “...you can make the case that reforming bankers’ 
compensation is the single best thing we can do to prevent another financial crisis a few 
years down the road”). 
4 See, Ben Bernanke, ‘Non Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of 
the Great Depression’ (1983) 73(3) American Economic Review 257. 
5 See, Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier, ‘Multiplicative Model of 
Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium’ (2009) 22(12) Review of Financial 
Studies 4881; Steven Kaplan and Joshua Rauh, ‘Wall Street and Main Street: What 
Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?’ (2010) 23(3) Review of Financial 
Studies 1004 (on the levels of compensation). See also, Paul Greg, Sarah Jewell and Ian 
Tonks, ‘Executive Pay and Performance: Did Bankers’ Bonuses Cause the Crisis?’ 
Working Paper (2011); Kevin Murphy and Michael Jensen, ‘CEO Bonus Plans: And 
How To Fix Them’ (2011) Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper 12 (on 
bonuses). See also, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, ‘Stealth Compensation Via 
Retirement Benefits’ (2004) 1 Berkley Business Law Journal 291; Lisa Goh and Yong Li 
‘Executive Pensions and Excess Compensation’ (2010) Working Paper (on pensions). 
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in corporate governance aimed at improving pay-setting processes6 and 
better aligning pay arrangements with the interests of shareholders by 
making performance related pay of the bank managers more risk 
sensitive.7  To avoid excessive incentives for risk-taking, reformers have 
also placed considerable weight on shareholder engagement.8 However, 
for such a strategy to make sense, it must be assumed that it is managerial 
pull rather than shareholder push that generates excessive risk-taking. 
The rule of limited liability has also attained a status of orthodoxy, 
with Henry Hansmann listing it as one of the core elements of 
corporate law the world over.9 Under conventional assumptions, limited 
liability is said to foster high-risk, high-yield activities with a net present 
value beneficial to social welfare. Any risk inducing incentives are 
assumed to be the price of securing efficient capital financing for 
corporations.10  
This paper concentrates on the excessive risk-taking of banks to 
challenge these conventional assumptions. Throughout, it is emphasised 
that banks are different. I make two main contributions. My first 
contribution seeks to persuade readers that excessive risk-taking is also 
partly a product of the conventional model. There are, I explain, two steps 
to this account. The first is an articulation of key factors that incentivise 
bank shareholders to prefer excessive risk-taking. Among other things, I 
show that one of the real criticisms of the conventional model when 
applied to banks is that the costs of failure are not largely internalised by 
                                                
6 See, for example, (mandatory “say on pay”) The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, §951, 124 Stat. 1375, 1899 (2010) (codified as Section 
14A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
7 See, for example, 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(3)(D)(i) (2009) (requiring that incentive 
compensation for senior executive officers of TARP recipients be exclusively in long-
term restricted common stock.) 
8 See, The Senior Supervisors Group, Risk Management Lessons From the Global 
Banking Crisis of 2008 (October 2009); The Walker Review: A Review of Corporate 
Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities: Final 
Recommendations (November 2009); The de Larosiere Group, The High Level Group 
on Financial Supervision in the EU (25 February 2009) 29. 
9 Henry Hansmann, ‘What is Corporate Law’ in Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, 
Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gérard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki 
Kanda, and Edward Rock (eds) Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and 
Functional Approach (2nd ed, OUP 2009). 
10 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, ‘Limited Liability and the Corporation’ (1985) 
52 University of Chicago Law Review 89. 
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the bank, they are borne, at least in part, by taxpayers. Consequently, bank 
shareholders do not take these costs into account when they determine 
their risk appetite, and so, their appetite for risk may be socially 
excessive. It follows that a bank which adheres to convention and is 
run in the interests of its shareholders is not necessarily enhancing 
social welfare. My second step is to describe the mechanisms through 
which exposure to shareholder pressure leads managers to take more 
risk. This account, contrary to convention, positively takes the view that 
excessive risk-taking is shareholder driven. My analysis ensures we ask, 
and give priority to, the right question-that is, how can bank 
shareholders’ risk appetite be minimised? 
My second contribution is to put forward a modified approach to 
bank governance, what I term the bank shareholder-orientated model, 
based on reducing the risk appetite of shareholders. I develop a case for a 
regime of double liability that is triggered by bank failure. Under this 
regime, bank shareholders would stand to lose an additional amount up to, 
but not exceeding, the par value of their stock in the bank. The increase in 
potential losses for shareholders, I argue below, will make shareholders 
more risk averse and induce them to enhance risk-taking controls, 
leading to the expectation of a reduction in excessive risk-taking. To 
provide support for this thesis, I examine empirical evidence on double 
liability in the United States from 1863 to 1933. Double liability then, could 
be seen as a complimentary addition to corporate governance measures 
aimed at reducing the excessive risk-taking of banks. 
This paper proceeds in three steps. Part B considers further the 
conventional model of governance, the concerns it seeks to address and 
its alleged benefits. Against this background, I describe in Part C key 
factors that incentivise bank shareholders to prefer socially excessive risk. 
I then introduce shareholder pressure as a separate likely channel of 
causation of excessive risk- taking. Part D concludes by showing the 
limitations of current corporate governance reforms for addressing the 
problem identified. In Part D, I modify the conventional model to include 
a regime of double liability. I analyse how this will reduce bank 
shareholders’ risk appetite, and, can help mitigate excessive risk-taking. 
Throughout Part D, I respond to possible objections for double liability. 
While the arguments of this paper are highly suggestive, the 
limitations of the analysis should be noted. The modified approach to 
corporate governance presented is confined to banks. Its suitability in other 
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sectors is left for future work to consider. It also worth stressing that the 
main focus of the analysis of double liability is on minimising bank 
shareholders’ risk appetite. 
 
B. THE CONVENTIONAL SHAREHOLDER-ORIENTATED MODEL  
Before the flaws of the shareholder-orientated model when applied to 
banks are explained, and a modified approach is presented, the reasons 
commentators have sought to rely on to justify the existing model must 
be brought out in more detail. 
 
1. The agency problem 
The starting point is to recognise a separation of management and 
finance, and of ownership and control. This has been rationalised under 
what has been termed “agency theory”.11 An agency relationship is a 
contract under which one person (the principal) engages another (the 
agent) to perform a service on their behalf, which involves delegating 
the authority to make decisions. Internal incentives are crucially 
important because the decisions which managers make depend on them 
and a principal can design incentives so as to limit the divergences from 
their interests. The effectiveness of managerial incentives can therefore 
directly impact firm performance. These incentives are embodied 
explicitly in employment contracts, and implicitly through the threat of 
dismissal or effect on reputation. Observable outcomes are used to 
provide information useful in determining whether managers have 
performed their job effectively.12  
 
2. Defining shareholder interests: maximising the stock price 
Next, it is useful to establish what shareholders are interested in.13 One of 
the primary interests of shareholders is the maximisation of their claims, 
                                                
11See generally: Ronald Coase, ‘The Nature of The Firm’ (1937) 4(16) Economica 386. 
See also, Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of the firm: managerial 
behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial 
Economics 305. 
12 Douglas Diamond and Robert Verrecchia, ‘Optimal Managerial Contracts and 
Equilibrium Security Prices’ (1982) 37 (2) Journal of Finance 275, 275. 
13 See further, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (Transaction Publishers, 1932). 
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as measured by the stock price. It is understood that bank management 
are, by their nature, more risk averse. This is because a bank manager’s 
human capital, reputational capital, private benefits of control, and 
financial capital are typically highly undiversified. As a result bank failure 
could impose significant costs on the bank’s managers that would not be 
borne by its shareholders.14 The conventional account holds that it is 
desirable to induce managers, through incentives, to take risks, so that 
high venture projects with positive net present values are not rejected. 
This is premised on the belief that such risks are socially optimal. The 
critical issue then turns on just how much risk bank shareholders favour. 
This is where I depart from convention. As I will argue in Part C, bank 
shareholders prefer socially excessive risk-taking. By taking excessive 
risks, I refer to taking actions that may either increase or decrease the 
value of the bank’s assets but whose expected effect on the bank’s value is 
negative.15  
Recognising the weak link between non-equity compensation and 
managerial performance, shareholders encourage the use of equity-based 
compensation, typically in the form of stock options. The intuition here is 
that the stock price is an observable measure of performance and can 
therefore be used to indicate the effectiveness of managerial decisions, 
aligning the incentives of managers with shareholder interests.16 It follows 
that managers are induced to pursue shareholder maximisation because 
their compensation is made up of options, putting the manager in the 
shoes of the shareholder, which makes them focus on what the stock 
price is. The rationale for using equity-based compensation is widely 
supported. Nguyen and Nielsen suggest that an efficient managerial 
labour market should compensate executives according to their 
                                                
14 For example, an executive’s professional standing would be adversely affected by a 
bank failure. Bebchuk and Jackson also recognise that in some circumstances, the bank 
may have deferred compensation programs and supplemental retirement account for 
their executives, and executives’ rights under these programs might be adversely 
affected by such failure. See, Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson, ‘Executive Pensions’ 
(2005) 30 Journal of Corporate Law 823. For further evidence on the use of such 
programs, see also, Rangarajan Sundaram and David Yermack, ‘Pay Me Later: Inside 
Debt and its Role in Managerial Compensation’ (2007) 62 Journal of Finance 1551. 
15 I adopt the same definition as used by Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann. See, 
Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann, ‘Regulating Bankers’ Pay’ (2010) 98 Georgetown 
Law Journal 247. 
16 See, for example, Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole, ‘Market Liquidity and 
Performance Monitoring’ (1993) 101(4) 
Journal of Political Economy 678. See also, ABI Guidelines on Executive Remuneration 
(December 2009). 
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contribution to shareholder value. 17  This is how equity-based 
compensation is supposed to work in practice: if executives make value 
enhancing decisions then this would increase firm value, as a result 
shareholder wealth increases, which, in turn, would reward executives. A 
study conduced by Hanlon, Rajgopal and Shelvin presents evidence that 
the granting of share option is linked to an increase in the future 
operating income of the firms investigated.18 This is not to say that the 
benefits are fully internalised to shareholder and managers. Indeed, in the 
case of banks, a more profitable bank has positive externalities to society. 
For example, it could help accelerate growth in the economy. Endorsing 
this shareholder-orientated model, Hansmann and Kraakman argue that 
social welfare is best served by encouraging corporate managers to pursue 
shareholder interests.19  
 
3. Excessive risk-taking and other problems 
Coming to the problem of excessive risk-taking. It has been widely 
recognised that managers had incentives to pursue excessive risk. I do not 
contend this. To guide us towards examining policies that can eliminate 
the incentives for excessive risk-taking, we must first attempt to identify 
the causation behind these incentives. In this regard, the conventional 
account, as advanced by Lucian Bebchuk and co-authors, suggests that  
inefficient,  distorted  and  nontransparent  structures  of managerial 
incentives are a result of their power.20 They argue that directors have 
been influenced by management and this has enabled them to obtain 
‘rents’-benefits greater than those obtainable under true arm’s-length 
contracting.21 There are a number of studies that appear to corroborate their 
                                                
17  Bang Dang Nguyen and Kasper Meisner Nielsen, ‘What Death can Tell: Are 
Executives Paid for Their Contributions to Firm Value?’ (March 2010) AFA 2011 Denver 
Meetings Paper. 
18 Michelle Hanlon, Shivaram Rajgopal and Terry Shelvin, ‘Are Executive Stock Option 
Associated with Future Earnings’ (2003) 36 Journal of Accounting and Economics 3. 
19 They argue that, “there is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate 
law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value”. See, Henry 
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 
Georgetown Law Journal 439, 439. 
20 Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise 
of Executive Compensation, (Harvard University Press, 2004). See also, Lucian  
Bebchuk  and  Yaniv  Grinstein,  ‘The  Growth  of  Executive Pay’ (2005) 21 Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 282. 
21 ibid. 
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claim that pay is higher, and less sensitive to performance, when 
executives have more power.22 According to this view, the design of 
managers’ stock options has enabled managers to reap substantial 
rewards even when their own performance was merely passable or even 
poor. 23  With options, it is alleged that executives have even more 
incentives for risk-taking than the common shareholders of bank holding 
companies.  
As a result, managerial incentives are not aligned with the interests 
of shareholders. This is because the manager will fully capture stock price 
gains but will not fully bear stock price declines, as common shareholders 
would,24 especially if the shareholders are diversified and have holdings in 
‘real economy’ companies. By having the freedom to exercise their 
options as soon as they vest and sell the underlying stock, managers 
were enabled to make considerable gains from temporary spikes in the 
company’s stock price, even when long-term stock performance is poor. 
The insulation from shareholder losses meant that managers could 
focus exclusively on the upside and ignore the downside of any risk 
strategy. Managers could therefore be incentivised to make excessive risk 
decisions based on the opportunity to maximise their short-term personal 
wealth at the expense of long-term shareholder value.25 The burden of 
Bebchuk’s argument is that, if the pay-offs from risk-taking are big 
enough, even undiversified managers will take big risks. In one study, 
Bebchuk et al, estimate that the top executive teams of Bear Stearns 
and Lehman Brothers derived cash flows of approximately $1.4 billion and 
                                                
22 See, for example, John Core, Robert Holthausen, and David Larcker, ‘Corporate 
Governance, Chief Executive Compensation, and Firm Performance’ (1999) 51 
Journal of Financial Economics 371 (finding outside directors who serve on three or 
more boards are more likely to be distracted.); Richard Cyert, Sok-Hyon Kang, and 
Praveen Kumar, ‘Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-Management 
Compensation: Theory and Evidence,’ (2002) 48 Management Science 453 (showing 
CEO pay is 20% to 40% higher if the CEO is the chairman of the board, and it is 
negatively correlated with the stock ownership of compensation committee members.); 
Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, ‘Agents With and Without Principals’ 
(2000) 90 American Economic Review 203 (finding in companies lacking large outside 
shareholders, boards make smaller reductions in cash compensation when they 
increase CEOs’ option-based compensation.) 
23 Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, ‘Pay Without Performance: Overview of the 
Issues’ (2005) 17(4) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8, 18. 
24  Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann, ‘Regulating Bankers’ Pay’ (2010) 98 
Georgetown Law Journal 247. 
25 See, for example, James March and Zor Shapira, ‘Managerial Perspectives on Risk’ 
(1987) 33(11) Management Science 1404. 
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$1 billion respectively from cash bonuses and equity sales during 2000-
2008.26 The implications of their analysis are that while shareholders lost 
the value of their shares, the bottom-line payoffs for managers were 
decidedly positive. Thus exemplifying a classic moral hazard problem. It 
is reiterated that according to the conventional account, the causation 
behind managerial risk-taking incentives is their power, showing that their 
incentives were not aligned with the interests of shareholders. 
Managerial opportunism,27 whether in the form of expropriation of 
investors or of misallocation of company funds is said to reduce the 
amount of resources that investors are willing to put up ex ante to finance 
the firm. 28  Furthermore, if financial arrangements do not enhance 
corporate governance then the mobilisation of savings from disparate 
agents and keep capital from flowing to profitable investment may be 
impeded.29 Another illustration of managerial power is that managers can 
expropriate shareholders by entrenching themselves and remain in their 
position even if they are no longer competent to run the firm.30 As 
argued by Jensen and Ruback, poor managers who resist being replaced 
might be the costliest manifestation of the “agency problem”.31  
 
4. The conventional remedies 
The conventional account alleges that shareholders had inadequate rights so 
as to facilitate effective shareholder engagement.32 This view has driven 
                                                
26 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Holger Spamann, ‘Wages of Failure: Executive 
Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008’ (2010) 27 Yale Journal on 
Regulation 257. 
27  See further, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate 
Governance’ (1997) 52(2) Journal of Finance 737. 
28 Sanford J Grossman  and  Oliver D Hart,  ‘The  Costs  and  Benefits  of  Ownership:  
A  Theory  of  Vertical  and  Lateral Integration’ (1986) 94(4) Journal of Political 
Economy 691. 
29 Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, ‘Incentive Effects of Terminations: 
Applications to the Credit and Labour Markets’ (1983) 73(5) American Economic 
Review 912. 
30 Andrei Shleifer  and  Robert  Vishny,  ‘Management  Entrenchment  the  Case  
of  Management-Specific Investments’ (1989) 25 Journal of Financial Economics 123. 
31  Michael Jensen and Richard Ruback, ‘The Market for Corporate Control: The 
Scientific Evidence’ (1983) 11 Journal of Financial Economics 5. 
32 See, for example, Lucian Bebchuk, ‘The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power’ 
(2005) 118(3) Harvard Law Review 
833. 
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shareholder-engagement high on the agenda in the U.S. and the U.K.,33 
which has led to a number of proposals aimed at limiting the deviations 
from shareholder interests. For example, Jensen and Murphy have 
recommended that, ‘creating firm value’ should not one of many 
objectives, but the firm’s sole or governing objective.34 Lucian Bebchuk 
has made the case for reform that strengthens shareholder rights35 - a 
proposition that has been supported by the Walker Review, which 
advocates greater integration of shareholders.36 This allows shareholders 
to better influence managerial behaviour. Among other things, this 
would allegedly discourage pay arrangements that reward executives for 
short-term gains and insulate them from losses to long-term shareholder 
value. To protect firm value, the shareholder-orientated model assigns 
shareholders a significant role in monitoring the riskiness of the activities 
executives are engaged with. A key result in the agency theory literature is 
that monitoring by a principal can allow improved contracts. 37  This 
development is said to help eliminate risk-taking incentives that are 
excessive from the shareholders’ perspective.38 According to this view, 
increasing bank shareholder engagement would provide superior risk 
management, reducing excessive risk-taking. 
However, in section C:7, such proposals will be shown to be highly 
controversial. It will be argued that at present, greater accountability by 
bank boards to shareholders is incapable of reducing excessive risk-taking, 
and may instead, exacerbate the problem. The case for the conventional 
account rests on the assumption that excessive risk-taking is not 
shareholder driven. Opposite to this, in Part C, I will show that the 
more convincing argument is that exposure to shareholder pressure lead 
management to accept greater risk. 
 
                                                
33 For example, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
H.R. 4173, 111th Cong., from 951-956. See also, The U.K. Stewardship Code (2010). 
34 Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy, ‘Remuneration: Where we’ve been, how we got 
here, what are the problems and how to fix them’ (2004) ECGI Finance Working Paper 
No. 44/2004. 
35 See, Lucian Bebchuk, ‘Letting Shareholder Set the Rules’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law 
Review 1784. 
36 The Walker Review: ‘A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other 
Financial Industry Entities’ Final Recommendations (November 2009) at Ch.5. 
37 Douglas Diamond, ‘Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring: A Simplistic 
Example’ (1996) 82(3) Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 51, 53. 
38 Lucian Bebchuk, ‘How To Fix Bankers’ Pay’ (2010) 139(4) Daedalus. 
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C. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT SHAREHOLDER-ORIENTATED 
MODEL IN A BANK SETTING 
Here, I argue that excessive risk-taking is also partly a product of the 
conventional model. There are two steps in this account. The first is an 
articulation of key factors that incentivise bank shareholders to prefer 
excessive risk-taking. Before proceeding, I recognise that many of these 
factors identified are also the same for managers. They have, however, 
received comparatively little attention in relation to shareholders. The 
second step is that bank shareholders play a key role in shaping the 
investment policy of the bank-by pressuring their management to accept 
greater risk. It is this step which drives the argument towards excessive 
risk-taking being shareholder push rather than managerial pull. Brining 
out the causal links guides the discussion towards considering what 
avenues of policy are promising to develop to mitigate excessive risk-
taking. 
 
1. Limited liability and internalisation of costs 
The intuition behind the assumption that shareholders are averse 
excessive risk is as follows. Shareholders stand to lose their investment 
in the event of failure. The risk of this loss, the conventional narrative 
suggests, acts as a sufficient incentive for shareholders to control risk. 
However, the alternative narrative developed here casts considerable 
doubt on this assumption. A first step to understanding why shareholders 
would be in favour of excessive risk is that they benefit from limited 
liability. This means that the holders of the equity stand to benefit from 
the upside of the risky project, for example through an increase in 
dividends during good times. However, their downside loss is capped to 
the equity they have at the time the project is undertaken. The gains 
made on the upside of excessive risk taking are not repayable on failure, 
assuming the shareholders have taken the gains out of the bank, either 
through distributions or share sales. Concededly, this may be truer of 
managers, before the recent reforms to remuneration schemes. 
Shareholders would certainly suffer some loss if the project is a disaster 
and the bank fails, however, they do not to internalise the costs of 
systemic risk associated with bank failure,39 such costs are borne, at least 
                                                
39 See, Jeffrey Gordon, ‘Say on Pay: Cautionary Notes’ (2009) 46 Harvard Law 
School Journal on Legislation 323, 365. 
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in part, by taxpayers. As a characteristic example, after suffering a 
collapse in the financial sector, Ireland have been reliant on an external 
assistance package worth €67.5bn.40 These costs far outstrip a bank’s 
internal and direct losses. Moreover, in the U.S., Federal programs made up 
of lending and guarantee commitments to various credit market 
participants was up to $7.7 trillion.41 The insulation from the taxpayer 
costs associated with failure produces two pronounced problems. First, it 
encourages over-investment in risky projects. This holds that 
shareholders induce bank management to take excessive risks, which 
result in a negative value for taxpayers, but due to the insulation from 
downside risks, could carry a positive expected value for bank 
shareholders. What this shows is the divergence between what is 
privately optimal risk-taking and what is socially optimal. Second, 
inefficiency is created: inadequate levels of care and under-investment 
in precautions, such as monitoring, against excessive risk. 
Convention might suggest that other mechanisms operate to 
internalise the costs of risk. However, as Armour and Gordon, who 
make the case for additional liability on bank directors, explain, 
regulatory controls are actively undermined by the conventional model 
and none of the ordinary internalisation mechanisms can be relied upon to 
protect society.42 This exposes a critical issue with the conventional model 
when applied to banks. It assumes that the costs of failure are largely 
internalised by the firm and so are taken into account when shareholders 
determine their risk appetite. If this is not the case, as has been shown 
with banks, then the shareholders’ risk appetite may be socially excessive. 
The analysis points towards an incentive incompatibility. It follows from 
the foregoing that shareholders have incentives to pressure the firm to 
take on more risk than is desirable, for example, the debt holders of the 
bank.43 This is because the debt holders do not stand to benefit from the 
                                                
40 The assistance package was funded by the European Financial Stability Mechanism, 
the IMF, the European Stability Facility and bilateral loans. - Independent Commission 
on Banking, Interim Report: Consultation on Reform Options, (April 2011), 22, [2.24]. 
41 Phil Kuntz and Bob Ivry, Fed Once Secret Price Data Compiled by Bloomberg 
Released to Public, Bloomberg, 23 December, 2011. 
42 John Armour and Jeffrey Gordon, ‘Systemic Harms and the Limits of Shareholder 
Value’ (2013) ALEA. 
43 This is consistent with findings from: Dan Galai and Ronald Masulis, ‘The Option 
Pricing Model and the Risk Factor of Stock’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 53. 
See also, Harold Demsetz and Kenneth Lehn, ‘The Structure of Corporate Ownership: 
Causes and Consequences’ (1985) 93(6) Journal of Political Economy 1155. 
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upside from the risky projects. As a result, a conflict exists between 
shareholder wealth maximisation and financial stability. 
 
2. Distinguishing shareholders 
At this point, it is helpful to disaggregate shareholders. This paper 
relates the distinction on the types of bank shareholders to one piece of 
literature. Jeffrey Gordon identifies a key divide in bank shareholders 
between the blockholders and diversified shareholders.44  
 
(a) Blockholders and risk 
Pursuant to the alternative narrative, Gordon claims that the blockholder 
may be willing to take excessive risk because it internalises the upside but 
not much of the systemic downside.45 In support of this view, Laeven and 
Levine show in an empirical assessment that banks with higher controlling 
shareholder ownership tend to be riskier.46 This can be explained through 
the greater incentives large shareholders have to invest resources in 
governance activism that can influence managerial behaviour. This is 
because they would stand to capture more of the gains from the excessive 
risks. Moreover, the blockholder will typically have larger voting and cash-
flow rights, conferring greater power to shape corporate behavior than 
smaller owners.47 Erkens, Hung, and Matos, using a sample of 296 firms 
from thirty countries, find that firms with more independent boards 
and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during 
the GFC.48 They conclude that firms with higher institutional ownership 
took “...greater risk in their investment policies before the onset of the 
crisis.” 49  This conclusion is, at least, consistent with the view that 
blockholders pressured management to take on greater risk - which was to 
                                                
44 Jeffrey Gordon, ‘Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in Financial 
Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay’ Columbia Law School and European 
Corporate Governance Institute Working Paper No.373 (2010). 
45 ibid, 6. 
46 Luc Laeven and Ross Levine, ‘Bank Governance, Regulation and Risk Taking’ 
(2009) 93(2) Journal of Financial Economics 259. 
47 See, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘Large Shareholders and Corporate Control’ 
(1986) 94(3) Journal of Political Economy 461. 
48 David Erkens, Mingyi Hung and Pedro Matos, ‘Corporate Governance in the 2007-
2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide’ (2012) 18(2) 
Journal of Corporate Finance 389. 
49 ibid, 390. 
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be to the detriment of bank stability. I now turn to contrast the risk appetite 
of blockholders with that of diversified shareholders. 
 
(b) Diversified shareholders and risk 
Limited liability allows more efficient diversification - a point 
emphasised by Henry Manne.50 Ordinarily investors can minimise risk 
by owning a diversified portfolio of assets. The intuition here is that in 
the event that one of the companies in their portfolio fails, their loss 
would be minimised to one small part of the portfolio. The narrative for 
banks, however, plausibly changes. It is at this point that Gordon’s 
concerns come to the fore. This brings us to a difference of opinion 
between Gordon and me on the risk appetite of diversified bank 
shareholders. His claim is that if the risk within the bank materialises and 
the bank fails, the diversified shareholder would suffer losses beyond 
their holding of equity in the bank, namely through their holding of equity 
in all of the other companies in their portfolio. This is because the 
expected profitability of many non-financial firms will be lowered via 
knock-on effects from contraction in the financial sector. For a bank 
shareholder, the systemic risk damages are therefore amplified through 
diversification. The benefits from an increase in the value of the 
shareholder’s holdings of equity are likely to be outweighed by the 
reduction in value of the portfolio as a whole. Gordon concludes that this 
effect means that diversified bank shareholders do not have incentives to 
encourage managers to take excessive risks.51  
 
3. An expectation of bailout 
Although Gordon provides illuminating analysis on the position of 
diversified bank shareholders, I cast a somewhat skeptical look at his 
claims. The reason for this skepticism is that his explanation only works 
when shorn of the expectation of bank bailouts. In essence, it is assumed 
that the bank will be allowed to fail. However, this brings back into focus 
one of the central themes of this paper- that is, banks are different. To 
                                                
50 Henry Manne, ‘Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics’ (1967) 53(2) 
Virginia Law Review 259. 
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avoid the costs associated with bank failure, governments across the U.S. 
and Europe have provided financial assistance to systemically important 
financial institutions close to insolvency.52 This created an expectation 
that other systemically important financial institutions approaching the 
brink of insolvency could rely on the likelihood of financial assistance 
from the government. The expectation of bank bailout alters the 
comparatively lower risk appetite of diversified shareholders’ suggested by 
Gordon. Suppose a bank approaching insolvency receives a bail out and 
consequently does not fail, any implications from systemic risk for the 
bank taking excessive risk would be minimised. When the bank engages 
in risk-taking activities it earns a risk premium for the risk it takes on, 
this translates into dividends for the shareholders. Diversified 
shareholders therefore stand to benefit from the upside of the risk-taking 
but would suffer little downside consequence to their market portfolio 
because the government intervenes to bail the bank out. Based on this 
expectation, the risk appetite of bank shareholders, on both sides of the 
divide, may be socially excessive. 
 
4. Deposit insurance 
The anticipation of bank bailout is one example of a more general 
problem that is most clearly exemplified by the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) 
status of many financial institutions.53 As a consequence to this status, 
many countries operate a system of state-backed deposit-guarantee 
schemes (DGS). Deposit insurance “...has succeeded in achieving what 
had been a major objective of banking reform for at least a century, 
namely the prevention of banking panics.”54 Despite the positive effects 
of DGS on preventing bank runs it also has negative side effects by 
incentivising bank shareholders to engage in excessive risk-taking, 
displaying a clear example of moral hazard. This is because bank 
shareholders stand to capture the full upside of the risk, while some of the 
                                                
52 Commitments to support the financial sector in the recent financial crisis peaked at 50 
per cent of GDP in the U.S. and 70 per cent in the U.K. See, Bank of England, 26 
Financial Stability Report, 6 (2009). 
53 See for example, Nassim Taleb  and  Charles  Tapiero,  ‘Too  Big  to  Fail,  Too 
Big  to  Bear,  and  Risk Externalities’ (2009) New York University Polytechnic 
Institute Research Paper. 
54 Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States 
(Princeton University Press, 1963) p. 440. 
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downside will be borne by government, as insurer of deposits should the 
bank become insolvent. Hence, the government insurer charges risk-
related deposit insurance premiums. Unfortunately, “...deposit insurance 
premiums have been unrelated to, or have not fully compensated...for 
increased risk posed by a particular bank.”55 One reason for this is that 
government, in part, due to political concerns, has constraints that limit 
their ability to discriminate between banks having different risks of 
failure.56 “Accordingly, banks are able to finance various projects at 
interest costs that are not commensurate with the risk of the projects...”57 
Risk-insensitive deposit insurance means that the risk is shifted on to the 
deposit insurer. Moreover, shareholders can use their control position to 
cause banks to engage in increasingly risky activities in order to transfer 
wealth from creditors, depositors, and ultimately the deposit insurance fund 
itself, to the shareholders of DGS banks. 58  The difference between 
between non-financial firms and banks is that banks can raise deposits 
more cheaply even if they are engaging in risky behaviour. While risk-
taking by non-financial institutions close to insolvency is constrained by 
market forces and contractual undertakings, which their shareholders 
will take into account, banks in a similar condition can continue to attract 
liquidity, due to deposit insurance.59 This substantiates the point made 
above, that bank shareholders will not take into account, when determining 
their risk appetite, the costs of failure, hence their risk appetite may be 
socially excessive. 
 
5. High levels of leverage 
Financial institutions can quickly increase its profitability by increasing 
its leverage. Financial leverage is desirable to shareholders as it can be 
used to increase the value of their equity call options.60 For any given 
                                                
55 George Hanc, ‘Deposit Insurance Reform: State of the Debate’ (1999) 12(3) Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Banking Review 1, 3. 
56 George Pennacchi, ‘Deposit Insurance’ (2009) AEI Conference on Private Markets and 
Public Insurance Programs, August 2009. 
57 George Hanc, ‘Deposit Insurance Reform: State of the Debate’ (1999) 12(3) Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Banking Review 1, 3. 
58 Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, ‘Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring and the 
Market for Bank Control’ (1988) 88 Columbia Law Review 1153, 1165. 
59 Jonathan Macey and Maureen O’Hara, ‘Corporate Governance of Banks’ (2003) Apr. 
Economic Policy Review 91, 98. 
60 Anthony Saunders, Elizabeth Strock and Nickolaos Travlos, ‘Ownership Structure, 
Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking’ (1990) 45(2) Journal of Finance 643, 644. 
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overall level of capital invested in the firm, a higher ratio of debt to equity 
limits the firm’s potential liability even further. This means that debt 
financing accentuates the disincentive to invest in safety and the 
incentive to over-invest in hazardous industries.61  
As previously discussed DGS renders debt a cheap source of funds 
and therefore biases banks toward it.62 Debt and equity would be equally 
expensive under the Modigliani-Miller theorem,63 however, in banks this is 
not necessarily the case. The implicit reduction in interest expense charged 
to TBTF banks creates an opportunity for cheap capital that cannot be 
spurned.64 This induces bank shareholders to pressure management to take 
full advantage of this cheap capital, increasing capital- to-asset ratios in the 
process. A clear example of this is in the U.K., where the ratio of debt 
to shareholders’ capital in banks can be seen to be much higher than 
non-financial firms.65 One significant implication of this is that banks 
have a thin layer of absorbable equity, which heightens the risk of failure. 
Shareholders’ preference for leverage is complemented by the creditors’ 
continuing expectation, as outlined above, that they will be protected in a 
federally-assisted rescue of a failing financial institution. 66  In effect, 
shareholders are afforded a level of protection, not only from the 
externalities associated with failure, but from the bank being allowed to 
fail in the first place, giving shareholders the motivation to seek to 
maximise the opportunity of cheap capital. 
 
6. Shareholder Pressure 
In the preceding sections, I have explained how excessive risk-taking is in 
the rational self-interest of bank shareholders given the key risk-inducing 
                                                
61 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability 
for Corporate Torts’ (1991) 100 (7) Yale Law Journal 1879, 1884. 
62 See further, Hamid Mehran, Alan Morrison and Joel Shapiro, ‘Corporate Governance 
and Banks: What Have We Learned from the Financial Crisis?’ Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York (2011) Staff Report no.502, 4. 
63 Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and 
the Theory of Investment’ (1958) 48(3) American Economic Review 261. 
64 John Coffee, ‘The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends 
to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated’ (2012) 97 Cornell Law Review 1019, 
1053. 
65 See, Independent Commission on Banking, Interim Report: Consultation on Reform 
Options, (April 2011). 
66 John Coffee, ‘The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to 
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factors that have been discussed. However, the limitations of the first 
step should be noted. Causation has not yet been identified. The point at 
present is that bank shareholders’ risk appetite is socially excessive. For 
the explanation offered in this paper to work, the bank’s investment 
policy would have to reflect this preference by shareholders pressuring 
their management to accept higher risk. The second step in this account 
brings the discussion to consider two mechanisms through which 
exposure to shareholders leads managers to take more risk. The first 
mechanism used to advance shareholder interests is through the design of 
pay-by increasing managerial pay contingent on the performance of 
firm value, typically in the form of stock options. As outlined in section 
I.C, such was the design of incentives, managers were induced to focus on 
increasing the short-term stock price, to the detriment of long- term firm 
value. Elijah Brewer III et al find evidence of a positive correlation 
between the increase of equity-based compensation in the U.S. banking 
sector in the 1990s and an increase in risk- taking.67 Allied with this, a 
study by Cheng et al, finds the level of residual pay is especially 
correlated with the firm’s beta and other measures of risk. This is 
consistent with the argument that executives were rewarded or encouraged 
to take excessive risks. The authors also find evidence that executives, who 
received the highest remuneration in the years leading up to the financial 
crisis of 2008-2009, were those in firms that performed the worst during 
the crisis.68 The critical point here is that these high-powered incentives 
could be what the shareholders of the bank wanted. Bank shareholders 
have been argued to be a force for greater risk-taking, therefore the more 
you align managerial incentives with shareholders the more there is a 
shift towards a higher acceptance of risk. This suggests that high-powered 
incentives are simply the carrot needed to get the bank to take risks desired 
by its shareholders.69 Indeed as John Coffee explains, “to ‘correct’ the 
managerial tendency toward risk aversion, shareholders might have been 
                                                
67 Elijah Brewer III, William Hunter and William Jackson III, ‘Deregulation and the 
Relationship Between Bank CEO Compensation and Risk-Taking’ (2003) Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper No. 2003-32. Bengt Holmstrom and Steven 
Kaplan suggest that the dramatic rise in shareholder influence that began in the 1980s 
explains the aggressive use of stock options. See, Bengt Holmstrom and Steven 
Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making 
Sense of the 1980s and 1990s’ (2001) 15 Journal of Economic Perspectives 121. 
68  Ing-Haw Cheng, Harrison Hong and Jose Scheinkman, ‘Yesterday’s Heroes: 
Compensation and Creative Risk- Taking’ (2010) NBER Working Paper No.16176. 
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willing to accept even imperfect compensation formulas to seduce 
managers into accepting increased risk.”70  
A manager’s survival in office relies on the maximisation of 
shareholder value. Shareholders may threaten managers with removal or 
loss of control if they reject risky projects that would increase the share 
price. One measure that could be helpful in determining the effectiveness 
of this mechanism is to examine managerial turnover rates. Kaplan and 
Minton observe that since 1998 managerial turnover in the U.S. increased 
meaningfully. Not counting takeovers, 12.4% of CEOs turned over each 
year, on average, from 1998 to 2003 and 12.2% of CEOs turned over each 
year, on average, from 2004 to 2010. They find a significant positive 
relationship relative to the turnover- performance sensitivity between 
performance and block shareholder ownership.71 Although the sample 
used in the study is taken from a cross-industry selection of large 
companies, the point to be made is that the threat of removal is an 
effective mechanism that allows bank shareholders to pressure their 
management to accept greater risk. It becomes realistic to suggest that 
managers not accepting of the levels of risk preferred by shareholders 
would be removed from office. Certainly, the blockholder would be in a 
position to exercise control and remove management. As a result, 
undiversified managers with greater exposure to removal by shareholders 
would be highly incentivised to accept greater risk. The analysis above 
indicates that these two mechanisms can help explain the excessive risk-
taking of banks. 
Suppose we were to accept the conventional account, we would 
expect banks with shareholder-friendly boards, which is taken to mean 
boards with a strong alignment with shareholder interests, to fare better. 
There is compelling evidence to the contrary. Fahlenbrach and Stulz find 
evidence that those banks with CEOs whose incentives were better 
aligned with their shareholders performed worse during the crisis. They 
conclude that, “CEOs with better incentives to maximise shareholder 
wealth took risks that other CEOs did not.”72 In another study, Beltratti 
                                                
70 John Coffee, ‘The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends 
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and Stulz analyse the significant variation in the cross-section of stock 
returns of large banks across the world during July 2007 to December 
2008. They find in correlation that banks with a shareholder-friendly board 
performed worse during the crisis. 73  While these findings can be 
interpreted as being consistent with the view that shareholder pressure 
led managers to accept greater risk, these studies find correlation, not 
causation. Moreover, it might be suggested these findings may also be 
consistent with the conventional account. As my analysis of the 
conventional account suggests, undiversified managers are risk averse, 
as a result, shareholders would want managers to take more risks. In the 
case of an unexpected shock to the system, those risks would lead to less 
good performance. It is still ambiguous whether excessive risk-taking is 
shareholder push or managerial pull. 
A study by Ferreira et al shows that management insulation can be 
used as a predictor of bank bailouts. They find that banks in which 
managers are fully insulated from shareholders are roughly 19 to 26 
percentage points less likely to be bailed out.74 The bailout being a 
measure of failure ex post. The authors interpret this as meaning that 
banks with managers less insulted, took on more risk and were therefore 
more likely to fail. Chen reaches similar results, finding that CEOs who 
are insulated from shareholder pressure and do not receive high-powered 
pay are less prone to engage in risk-taking.75 The results do not give much 
comfort to the believer in the conventional model. These are important 
studies for the alternative account as they provide, in correlation, 
evidence that shareholder push rather than managerial pull was behind 
bank risk-taking. This previously missing evidence suggests that the thesis 
presented holds validity. 
The foregoing analysis reveals that two problems exist. The first, put 
forward by the conventional account is that compensation arrangements 
created excessive incentives for bank managers to engage in risky 
activities. The second problem identified in this paper, made up of two 
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parts, is that (1) bank shareholders’ risk appetite is socially excessive and 
(2) exposure to shareholder pressure leads managers to take more risk. 
We should not choose between these problems-both need to be 
adequately addressed. This paper will now consider the extent to which 
current corporate governance reforms addresses these problems. 
 
7. Why managerial incentives reforms are not enough? 
Given the nature of the problem of incentives it is common to look to 
corporate governance reforms as the solution. The flaws in managerial 
compensation arrangements have prompted a plethora of policies aimed at 
making manager’s earnings sensitive to the risks run to acquire the 
earnings.76 This is a step in the right direction and such measures can 
discourage some risk-taking. However, they do little to mitigate the bank 
shareholder problem identified. No matter how risk sensitive the 
performance related pay of managers is made, bank shareholders have 
other means by which to pressure and incentivise their management to 
accept greater risk. An example already given is the threat of removal, 
which the analysis in this paper has shown can also highly incentivise 
managers to take risks. 
What is worse, another common response has been for legislators 
and regulators to adopt measures aimed at empowering shareholders to 
prevent deviation from shareholder interests, which may instead exacerbate 
the problem. For instance, in the U.S., the ability of bank shareholders to 
pressure their management to accept greater risk has been significantly 
enhanced.  By giving shareholders access to the proxy statement, the SEC 
Rule 14a-11 intends to facilitate the ability of dissident shareholders to 
place their nominees on the corporate board at low cost, giving 
shareholders a stronger voice on the board.77 Similarly, in the U.K., 
                                                
76 See, Financial Stability Board, Financial Stability Forum Principles for Sound 
Compensation Practices, April 2, 2009; 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(3)(D)(i) (2009) 
(codifying the EESA and incorporating amendments pursuant to the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009). The stimulus bill requires that incentive 
compensation for top officers and employees of TARP recipients be exclusively in 
long-term restricted common stock. See also, The Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors, Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices, December 10, 2010; 
77 The Securities Act Release No. 33-9136 (“Facilitating Shareholder Communication”) 
(August 25, 2010). For further analysis of the rule in relation to such arguments see, 
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Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight’ (2011) 111 Columbia Law Review 795, 814. 
 Toward a Bank Shareholder-Orientated Model 
 
 162 
changes to the U.K. Corporate Governance Code aims to increase the 
accountability to shareholders.78 It should be noted that this is a general 
corporate reform, not a bank specific one. For the reasons above, excessive 
risks from a social perspective are not necessarily excessive from bank 
shareholders’ perspective. Therefore, from a systemic risk perspective, it 
cannot be assumed that bank shareholders are the champion of moderation. 
These measures do nothing to limit the risk appetite of bank 
shareholders and, as a result, cannot be expected to eliminate incentives 
to take socially excessive risks. Instead, by increasing shareholder 
engagement, this would plausibly lead to more of the same excessive risk- 
taking, policy makers are aiming to mitigate. The bottom line is then, in 
the absence of reducing bank shareholders’ appetite for risk, empowering 
shareholders may not only not be the answer, it may compound the 
problem. Viewed in this light, it seems one promising avenue would be 
to modify the conventional model so as to refashion the incentives of bank 
shareholders. 
 
C. INTRODUCING THE BANK SHAREHOLDER-ORIENTATED MODEL 
The bank shareholder risk diagnosis offered opens space for policy 
instruments, which reduce the risk appetite of bank shareholders. In this 
section, double bank shareholder liability is presented as a modification to 
the conventional model to achieve this. From the outset, it is 
acknowledged that a regime of double liability would impose numerous 
costs, for example, the indirect social costs of efforts to evade liability, 
and is therefore not a policy without its flaws. However, it is argued that 
such a regime has substantial merits in both its deterrent effect against 
excessive risk-taking and its incentive effect to induce bank shareholders 
to more effectively monitor, investigate and control risk - an important 
activity goal. To both illustrate and test this proposition, the functioning 
of double liability is analysed in one historical epoch: the United States 
from 1863 to 1933. Throughout, this section, I acknowledge and respond to 
likely objections to double liability. 
 
1. A double liability standard 
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As I have repeatedly emphasised, the problem with the conventional 
model when applied to banks is that it assumes that the costs of failure are 
largely internalised by the firm and so are taken into account when 
shareholders determine their risk appetite. Analysis has shown that this is 
not the case with banks, hence bank shareholders’ risk appetite is socially 
excessive. As a result, the conventional model does not work to the 
benefit of social welfare because of the externalities attached to bank 
failure. There is another technique that could be used in governance, 
which is to cause shareholders to suffer additional liability in the event of 
failure. This signals a departure from a central characteristic of modern 
corporate law-the current limited liability rule. One way this can be done 
is to impose a regime of double liability. Under double liability, 
shareholders of failing banks stand to lose, first, the initial cost of their 
shares in the bank. Then, if the bank’s assets are insufficient to pay off its 
depositors and other creditors, shareholders are exposed to an additional 
amount up to, but not exceeding, the par value of their stock in the bank. 
This is counted as their contribution toward making up the difference 
between the bank’s assets and liabilities. Whereas previous literature and 
justification for double liability has revolved around protecting bank 
creditors, my work differs in a relatively novel way. The main focus of 
the regime in this paper is the extent to which it can reduce bank 
shareholders’ risk appetite. It is to this aspect of the regime I turn to next. 
 
2. Risk-taking and risk management 
Macey and Miller argue that double liability transforms shareholders 
from investors seeking to advantage themselves at the expense of other 
investors by increasing the riskiness of the banks in which they have 
invested, into investors who benefit themselves by decreasing the riskiness 
of these firms. 79  Bank shareholders exposed to double liability may 
legitimately be more conservative in evaluating an investment that brings 
socially excessive risk because bank failure would impose a higher cost 
on them than under the current regime. Under the existing model, bank 
shareholders are induced to displace as much cost of the bank’s risky 
activities to taxpayers as possible. Concededly, double liability would not 
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be linked to the size of the failure externalities. However, the regime 
provides an improved level of cost internalisation. Moreover, the 
contingent additional loss shareholders face if the bank fails would reduce 
the risk appetite of bank shareholders, making them more risk averse. This 
may deter shareholders from pressuring their management to accept 
socially excessive risk. In this situation, the improved level of cost 
internalisation means that bank shareholders would be more likely to take 
into account the costs of their investment projects. It follows that this 
could be reflected in the bank’s investment policy, reducing its 
riskiness. To illustrate this incentive effect in practice, two examples are 
given. In an important study, using data from 1900 to 1915, focusing on 
solvent banks, Benjamin Etsy analyses whether the regime of double 
liability had any effect on their risk-taking behaviour. The study finds in 
correlation, that banks subject to double liability held a lower proportion 
of risky assets, especially at low levels of net worth. More importantly, 
double liability appeared to discourage banks from investing in risky 
assets as their net worth declines. In a separate but corroborating analysis 
on California banks, Etsy observes that in conversion from state to 
national charter, which corresponds to a decrease in shareholder 
liability, there was an in increase in risk-taking. 80  In another study, 
Richard Grossman examines the relationship between double liability and 
bank risk-taking during 1892 to 1930, using balance sheet and failure data 
to proxy for risk-taking, controlling for macroeconomic and regulatory 
conditions, as they may affect the various measure for risk-taking. The 
study finds evidence that suggests double liability did reduce risk-taking 
among banks in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 
effects of double liability in the study can be seen through a correlation 
between lower failure rates, higher capital ratios, and higher liquidity 
ratios with state banks in multiple-liability states.81 Put together, these 
correlations can, at least, be viewed as consistent with the argument 
that double liability deters excessive bank risk-taking by reducing bank 
shareholders’ risk appetite. 
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D. RECOVERY 
So far, in Part C, this paper has analysed the incentive effects of double 
liability in discouraging excessive risk-taking. Here, I consider data on the 
recovery from shareholders-an important aspect of the regime-to determine 
its effectiveness. When Congress passed the 1863 Act, it largely ignored 
enforcement details. Instead, a combination of legislative action and 
judicial decisions ultimately established the enforcement mechanisms. A 
similar approach could be taken. According to Macey and Miller the 
Comptroller of the Currency collected 51% of assessments made between 
1865 and 1934, an amount equal to 28% of creditor losses in national 
banks.82 Upham and Lamke report that state regulators collected 43.8% of 
assessments made between 1921 and 1930.83 While recovery rates under 
this regime are far from perfect, it should be noted that bank managers 
and directors were often large shareholders. When a bank failed, they lost 
both their human and financial capital, yet were still able to pay a large 
fraction of the assessments.84  
A second piece of evidence on the credibility and effectiveness of 
double liability cited by Etsy is the number of voluntary bank closures. 
Etsy argues that since 1933, under limited liability, bank shareholders 
have had no incentive to close voluntarily because that would extinguish 
their call option on the bank’s assets.85 In contrast, under double liability, 
from 1865 to 1933, voluntary liquidations accounted for 70% of the 8302 
national-bank liquidations, and over 80% of the liquidations from 1865 to 
1912.86  
This data shows that under the previous double liability regime, 
Federal regulators had the legal precedence and enforcement 
mechanisms to collect meaningfully from shareholders. As Macey and 
Miller conclude “that it was not perfect is no objection to its efficacy; no 
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regulatory program is perfect, and the one that supplanted double liability-
deposit insurance-certainly is not”.87  
 
1. Shareholder engagement 
If we take the conclusion that double liability does reduce bank 
shareholders’ risk appetite, at this point, shareholders on both sides of 
the divide articulated earlier, should be a good proxy for society. 
Double liability then, would induce bank shareholders to undertake more 
monitoring and investigating to control risk. This is where I become 
supportive to measures aimed at increasing shareholder powers and 
engagement. Relying on shareholder activism is more desirable than 
government intervention. This is because firms will often have more 
information and potentially better expertise than government officials at 
monitoring or investigating managers. However, after assigning 
shareholders a greater role in the monitoring and policing of 
managerial risk-taking decisions, there may arise a concern about an 
increase in cost barriers. There are two points to be made here. The first 
is that the costs of activism could be reduced since double liability, by 
imposing contingent additional costs, motivates both the blockholder 
and the diversified shareholder to engage in activism to control risk. 
Collective activism would reduce the costs associated with further 
shareholder engagement. The second point, to partly address the free-rider 
problem and further reduce cost barriers, is to introduce a 
reimbursement rule. Lucian Bebchuk makes a proposal of this character, 
whereby, shareholders who initiate proposals that gain a substantial 
number of votes would be reimbursed by the company.88 These elements 
are an effort to give shareholders the power to monitor, investigate and 
control risk optimally, with as little cost barriers as possible. 
One response to my support of proposals to increase shareholder 
engagement might be that, as agency theory recognises, we do not have 
to rely exclusively on shareholders to monitor and control risk. In line 
with this view, legislators and regulators have put forward measures 
                                                
87 Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, ‘Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: 
History and Implications’ (1992) 27 Wake Forest Law Review 31, 35. 
88 Lucian Bebchuk, ‘Letting Shareholder Set the Rules’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 
1784, 1799. 
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for bolstering the role of independent directors.89 Effective, independent 
directors who inject the interests of taxpayers into the risk management of 
the bank, may at once, weaken the case for the need to reduce the risk 
appetite of bank shareholders and make redundant the proposal of double 
liability. However, it is not immediately clear that independent directors 
are aligned with taxpayers’ interests. As Bebchuk and Spamann 
acknowledge, “even in the ideal model, independent directors are elected 
by and represent shareholders who [...] have incentives to take higher risks 
than would be socially optimal.”90 Significantly, in this case, independent 
directors represent an additional resource for shareholders that can 
pressure management to accept greater risk. Consequently, independent 
directors cannot be expected to provide socially optimal managerial 
incentives. 
 
2. Evasion 
Evasion strategies are an obvious threat to a double liability regime. In 
the corporate tort debate, Joseph Grundfest claimed that an unlimited 
liability regime is unlikely to work because capital markets will generate 
large pools of non-assessable shareholders.91 The same claim applies to 
a regime of double liability. One of Grundfest’s main proposed evasion 
schemes is an effort by market intermediaries to create specialised 
holding structures (or investment funds) to separate returns on equity 
from the risk of paying excess tort damages under a proportionate liability 
rule. Such a fund would hold no assets except stock in a single risky firm. 
In addition, it would issue no equity itself that might absorb the personal 
liability attaching to its investment shares. Investors in the fund could 
therefore hope to divide the returns from risky equity free of the danger 
of double liability.92 As Hansmann and Kraakman, who argue in favour of 
a regime of unlimited liability for corporate torts, respond, no court would 
accept such a fund at face value because its sole function would be to 
                                                
89 See, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Enhancements to the Basel II Framework 
(2009) 26, which requires the involvement of expert, independent directors in the design 
and operation of banks’ compensation policies. 
90 Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann, ‘Regulating Bankers’ Pay’ (2009) Harvard 
Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper 
Series. Paper 634, 36. 
91 Joseph Grundfest, ‘The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets 
Perspective’ (1992) 102 Yale Journal on Regulation 387. 
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evade liability. In the event of failure, a court would-or at least should-
assign the full liability of the fund’s equity holdings to its investors.93  
Similarly, the court should have little difficulty identifying an 
opportunistic recapitalisation in which, to avoid liability, an issuer shrinks 
its traditional equity base to a small pool of attachment-proof shareholders 
while employing equity substitutes and debt to serve the risk bearing and 
control functions normally served by common stock. Confronted with 
such a blatant evasion tactic, a court need only re-characterise the equity 
substitutes as constructive equity for purposes of, in this case, double 
liability.94  
Small domestic shareholders, Grundfest argues, are likely to 
escape damage assessments under a proportionate liability rule because 
they will owe too little to justify the costs of collecting from them.95 
Taking inspiration from one of the recommendations from Hansmann and 
Kraakman: federal legislation could shift the legal costs of collecting 
on a valid double liability debt to shareholders and deter even the 
smallest shareholder from ignoring a judgment.96  
The evasion efforts considered here are not intended to be 
exhaustive. I do not dispute that evasion efforts represent real problems 
for double liability. If bank shareholders are themselves limited liability 
entities, then any effort to collect more than the equity investment is 
immediately thwarted.97  For this reason, I support giving courts the 
authority to declare any efforts to evade double liability with the 
corporate form invalid. This paper also emphasises that the case studies 
cited above on recovery under double liability provides reassurance as to 
the feasibility of such a regime and therefore suggests evasion-based 
objections are not insurmountable. 
 
                                                
93 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Do the Capital Markets Compel Limited 
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97  Peter Conti-Brown, ‘Solving the Problem of Bailouts: A Theory of Elective 
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3. Costs of equity 
Another argument supporting the retention of the current limited liability 
regime is an equity costs issue. It might be suggested that under double 
liability, the cost of equity would increase to an inappropriately high 
level, since banks are subject to capital requirements this could 
problematic. As a result, investors may be discouraged from investing in 
banks. Two points can be made in this regard. First, under the previous 
double liability regime, this appears not to have been a source of great 
concern-banks still attracted investors. However, as indicated earlier 
when double liability previously operated the structure of shareholding 
was concentrated. Diversified shareholders might think the costs of 
monitoring are not worth the returns. Second, as Peter Conti-Brown, an 
advocate for elective shareholder liability, convincingly argues, the cost of 
equity would merely be raised to an efficient level to reflect and 
internalise risk.98 Thus, from a market efficiency perspective, this could 
be seen as beneficial. At present, this is a speculative concern since 
there is insufficient evidence to indicate to what extent the cost of 
equity would increase and the extent to which investors would be 
discouraged. Before either the concern or the case for double liability 
is defeated, more evidence is required. 
 
4. Double liability: a complementary policy 
Double bank shareholder liability can be viewed as complimentary to two 
existing policy approaches. The first approach, exemplified by the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, seeks to 
end government bailouts.99 As pointed out by Lawrence Summers, a 
healthy financial system cannot be built on the expectation of bailouts.100 
The second, as described in section II.G, is the targeted approach of 
making remuneration arrangements sensitive to risk, an approach which 
                                                
98  Peter Conti-Brown, ‘Solving the Problem of Bailouts: A Theory of Elective 
Shareholder Liability’ (2011) Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper 
Series No.97, 55. 
99 Additionally, § 214(c) prohibits taxpayer funding. For academic support on this 
move, see, Kenneth Scott, George Shultz and John Taylor, Ending Government 
Bailouts As We Know Them, (Hoover Institution Press 2009). See also, David Skeel, 
The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and its (Unintended) 
Consequences, (John Wiley & Sons 2011). 
100 Lawrence Summers, ‘International Financial Crises: Causes, Prevention, and Cures’ 
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this paper also supports. It is stressed that reform should not come down to 
a choice between such measures or double liability. Indeed, the analysis 
in section II.F has indicated that there are two problems present. 
Consequently, it is argued that both measures can be complimentary to one 
another. It might, however, be suggested that further proposals such as 
those advocated by Patrick Bolton et al, basing compensation on both 
stock price and the price of debt (proxied by the CDS spread),101 or, 
Jeffrey Gordon, convertible equity-based pay, are preferable. 102  The 
argument may be that such measures go more directly to the problem 
than double liability because if managerial compensation arrangements are 
adequately risk sensitive, the space open for excessive risk-taking would 
be limited. Even if it is accepted that bank risk-taking is shareholder 
push rather than managerial pull, it could further be argued that under these 
measures shareholders’ ability to pressure management to accept greater 
risk might also be limited. The thinking here is that the main mechanism 
that exposes managers to shareholder  pressure - the  design  of  pay 
arrangements-would be considerably weakened since shareholders would 
no longer have a free hand in designing such arrangements. However, this 
brings back into focus an earlier point-that is, bank shareholders have 
other means by which to pressure and incentivise their management to 
accept greater risk. The alternative mechanism brought to light in this paper 
is the threat of removal. As argued in section II.F, a manager’s survival in 
office relies on the maximisation of shareholder value. If managers, as a 
result of risk-sensitive pay arrangements, reject risky projects that increase 
the share price, bank shareholders could threaten to remove them from 
office. Shareholders could therefore continue to pressure their  
management  to  accept  greater  risk  through  the  threat  of removal. 
Managers, standing to lose their human capital, private benefits of 
control, financial capital, and have their reputation negatively affected by 
removal, could be highly incentivised to comply. Viewed in this light, 
such measures cannot be relied on to completely mitigate bank 
shareholders’ push towards excessive risk-taking. Double liability targets 
another aspect of the problem by making bank shareholders more risk 
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averse, and can, as a result, be thought of as a complimentary policy that 
bridges the gap in the response to make less likely, excessive risk-taking. 
Finally, double liability could also have direct implications for 
managers. The reason for this is that if equity continues to account for a 
large proportion of managerial compensation, which the stimulus bill 
indicates will be the case,103 then managers required to retain stock 
would also be liable in the event of bank failure, for an amount up to, 
but not exceeding, the par value of their stock in the bank. This could 
produce a similar incentive for managers to reduce their appetite for risk. 
 
E. CONCLUSION  
This paper has argued that excessive risk-taking is also partly a product of 
the conventional model. It has identified some key factors that have 
provided bank shareholders with incentives to pressure management to 
accept greater risk. Current corporate governance reforms have been 
shown to be incapable of addressing the problem identified. To reduce bank 
shareholders’ risk appetite, the paper has modified the conventional model 
to include a plausible alternative approach-a regime of double liability. The 
characteristics and policy advantages of double liability have been 
explored, with the aid of empirical evidence. Possible objections for the 
regime have been recognised, and in responding to such objections, it has 
been suggested that they are not insurmountable-the costs of equity issue 
remains unresolved. Of course, there may be arguments that could defeat 
the case for double bank shareholder liability. However, they have yet to 
be introduced into the debate. It is hoped that this paper sparks renewed 
interest in the regime, as the burden is now shifted on the proponents of 
the existing model and current limited liability regime to provide a 
persuasive case for their continued existence in banks. 
The thesis presented in this paper may be hard to swallow. The 
conventional model is deeply rooted in corporate governance, while the 
current rule of limited liability has also gained a status of orthodoxy. 
However, until the problem identified is both acknowledged and 
                                                
103  12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(3)(D)(i) (2009) (codifying the EESA and incorporating 
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 Toward a Bank Shareholder-Orientated Model 
 
 172 
addressed, excessive risk-taking cannot be expected to be significantly 
reduced by corporate governance. 
